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This paper deals with data security. It identi U- 
rity threats to European Space Agency's In 
Orbit Infrastructure Ground Segment (IO1 GS) and 
proposes a method of dealing with its complex data 
structures from the security point of view. It is part of 
the "Analysis of Failure Modes, Effects Hazards and 
Risks of the IO1 GS for Operations, including Back- 
up Facilities and Functions" carried out on behalf of 
the European Space Operations Centre (ESOC). 
The security part of this Analysis has been prepared 
with the following aspects in mind 
- 
- 
ESA's large decentralized ground facilities for 
operations, 
the multiple organizations/users involved in the 
operations and the developments of ground data 
systems, and 
the large heterogeneous network structure enab- 
ling access to (sensitive) data which does involve 
crossing organizational boundaries. 
- 
An IO1 GS data objects classification is introduced to 
determine the extent of the necessary protection me- 
chanisms. The proposal of security countermeasures 
is oriented towards the European "Information 
Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC)" 
whose hierarchically organized requirements can be 
directly mapped to the security sensitivity classifica- 
tion. 
1 
The f i t  consideration for the formulation of the se- 
curity situation is the threats to which elements of the 
IO1 GS are exposed. The threats are a function of the 
operational environment of the system and sensitivity 
of the data being processed in the various IO1 GS fa- 
cilities. The three basic security threats /lTSEC/ to 
which the facilities are exposed to are: 
- the unintentional or u~uth~r ized  disclosure (loss 
of confidentiality), 
- the unintentional or unauthorized modification 
(loss of integrity), and 
- the unintentional or unauthorized destruction 
(loss of availability). 
SECURITY SITUATION OF THE IO1 GS 
The causes of these threats are not only misuse. 
Weak points in the Information Technology, human 
failure, and acts of 
The threats can be o 
rent types of data. 
the disclosure of operations commands represents 
little or no threat, while their modification can cause 
serious damage, at worst the physical destruction of 
the spacecraft and the death of the crew if more than 
one command was modified. 
The second consideration would be the assessment of 
the materialization of these threats in the context of 
the IO1 GS environment. Assumed impacts could be 
estimated in terns of 
- Ioss/injury of human life 
- 
- degradation of functionality 
- delay of mission 
destruction of/damage to material and/or equip- 
ment 
as for example laid down in the ESA standard ESA 
PS s -0 1-40. 
The problem lies now in the creation of appropriate 
IO1 GS units (function, data, or facility), which en- 
able the association with home sort of security classi- 
fication. The solution of this problem would result in 
a categorization scheme for the selected IO1 GS units. 
Such a categorization scheme would simplify the 
identification of weak points and allow the assign- 
ment and evaluation of countermeasures to reduce the 
security risk. 
2. APPROACH ADOPTED 
The approach adopted in this analysis is illustrated in 
Figure I. It describes basically the method of catego- 
rizing data into sensitivity levels which are applied to 
the IO1 operations systems. This includes the defini- 
tion of data objects (for example Payload Experiment 
Results, Telemetry, Platform Operations Commands) 
used within the IO1 GS. These data objects are asso- 
ciated with their environment so that it is possible to 
imagine potential threats and their materialization. 
The worst impact assessment leads to one of five 
consequence classes (a chapter 4) for each of the 
analyzed data objects. Thus it becomes apparent 
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which data needs to be protected and which not. The 
results of this assignment are summarized in decision 
Modification Threat 
DiSClosUre 
Threat 
Categorization of 
IO1 GS Data/SoRWare. 
Allocation to 
countermeaslnes 
es 
Security 
Figure 1 : Approach Adopted 
The sensitivity of the considered data object determi- 
nes the effectiveness of the measure(s) to be imple- 
mented to counter the risk (m chapter 8 and 9). 
3 SECURITY THREATS TO THE 101 GS 
The security threats as pointed out above must be 
applied to all phases of the mission(s), including the 
preparation, the operation, and the maintenance. The 
following list of some of the most important threats is 
particularly related to the nature of IO1 GS. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Introduction of unapproved codes during soft- 
ware development in terms of (non-) correctness 
and potential to be "infected". This is especially 
important due to the involvement of the large 
number of f m s  entrusted with the task of deve- 
loping "ESA software". 
As a result of the above mentioned point the ac- 
cess to confidential design documentation 
(hardcopies and on-line documents) by potential 
misusers is relatively easy. 
The degree of decentralization of the Ground- 
Facilities-for-Operations (GFO) necessitates 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
This creates strong demands on the data protec- 
tion mechanisms against erroneous and uninten- 
tional manipulation of data. 
The use of state-of-the art, ergonomically opti- 
mized Human Computer Interfaces (HCI) may 
also be useful for people having gained access to 
a computer for malicious purposes. Then the 
"help functions" could be too helpful. 
The freedom of the User Home Bases (uni- 
versities, research centers) to run their on board 
experiments (payload control, processing of 
experiment data) and develop their own on board 
software for this purpose involves the danger. that 
the user's software cannot be controlled in the 
same way as ESA software. That means secure, 
software controlled operations are difficult to 
achieve. 
The repeated updates/upgrades/ replacements re- 
quired to be carried out on IO1 and GS systems 
(by ESA as well as by users) call for security 
considerations of the same kind as the original 
development. 
The maintenance of ESA data processing facili- 
ties through "outside" suppliers holds the danger 
of ease access to hardware, software components 
and critical data (for example replacing of hard- 
disk, or software updates). This is specially im- 
portant for re-arranging of system configuration 
or system adjustment. - If system changes can 
only be carried out by the supplier, a dependency 
in a very sensitive area arises. 
10. For safety and availability reasons backup opera- 
tions centers must be provided (for example ha- 
ving an additional stand-by control centers du- 
ring critical operations). This further increases 
the security risk for dawsoftware as well as for 
communications and people (see above). 
4 CONSEQUENCE CLASSES 
The first stage in the creation of security classes is 
the definition or application of some sort of come 
quence classes. Each piece of software or data can be 
associated with one of these consequences classes as- 
692 
suming the worst impac 
tion of a pot en^ threat 
(Hazard Consequence 
security related conse 
defi ey comprise in short: 
1. CAT (Catastrophic): Loss of life, life threatening 
or permanently, disabling injury. 
2. CRT (Critical): Temporary non-availability of 
some flight systems or some of its vital parts that 
could cause the failure of experiments. 
In both cases, the only recovery is to abort the current 
mission. 
3. MAR (Marginal): Temporary non-availability of 
some systems. 
4. SQM (Subsequent Mission): No consequence for 
the current mission. Unauthorized use of data 
could compromise potentially future mission(s). 
5. NEG (Negligible): Minor problems, without se- 
rious impacts on the mission. 
5 DATAOBJECTS 
A further step to reach a security classification is the 
definition of data objects used within the 101 GS. 
Taking into account the risks involved in the conse- 
quence classes described above, these data objects 
Each of the above mentioned data objects (and the 
software which handle it) was evaIuated in respect of 
were summarized in tables of which one example is 
shown below: 
Table 1:  Decision Table (Example) 
Abbreviations of the considered threats as used in the 
tables: 
- mod = modification (covert and open) 
- des = destruction (both irrehievabie des- 
- dis = disclosure 
truction and temporary inaccessibility) 
provide the basis for the worst impact analysis. - The decision tables assign a sensitivity class to each 
data object. The class is derived from their Hazard 
Consequence Severity Category. Thus in the example 
shown in Table I the "Experiment Data" is 
The following list contains the generic data objects 
for those pieces of data defiied for the IO1 GS: 
- CrewData 
- MedicalData 
- Voice/Video Data 
- PlatformData 
- Commands 
- Telemetry 
- PayloadData 
- Commands 
- Telemetry 
- ExperimentData 
- Ground Segment Data 
- Command Process-Line 
- Telemetry 
- Engineering Support, Test and Training 
- Characteristics Data Base 
- Reports 
- ExperimentData 
- Filed Experiment Data 
- Network and GFO Management Data 
categorized as critical in the event of its modification 
and destruction (mddes). The disclosure risk (dis) is 
negligible. 
7 
The evaluation of the data objects has revealed that in 
the majority of cases the modification (covert and 
open) and destruction of data and software can have 
more serious implications on the mission and its 
environment than the disclosure risk. This finding 
should justify placing emphasis on the protection 
against the materialization of these kinds of risks. 
Special attention must be paid to the very sensitive 
data objects, such as "PF operations commands", "sy- 
stem operational procedures", including their teleme- 
try and the "network and GS management data". 
Their modification could result in catastrophic con- 
sequences. It is therefore important that these kinds 
of data are treated separately in relation to processing 
storage and transmission. 
CRITICAL IO1 Gs DATA OBJECTS 
Another very sensitive type of data is that of "net- 
work and GFO management", since it contains all se- 
curity implementation characteristics, such as compu- 
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ter hardware, software and 
access control information. 
m ~ f y i n g  this sort of data 
in". This provides them with the opportunity to conti- 
nue wi er (malicious) manipulations. So the 
administration of this data must provide a very effec- 
tive mechanism to protect it against unauthorized 
disclosure. 
In this context it is worthwhile noting that long term 
investigations carried out by security consultants dea- 
ling with a broad spectrum of customer establish- 
ments have found out that the most important threat 
of errors and omissions is caused by honest em- 
ployees, who make mistakes in data entry, data up- 
date, changes in applications, etc. 
8 COrnVTERMEA§URE§ 
The main goal of the study is to describe a systematic 
method for identification of threats and the allocation 
of suitable countermeasures. The estimated degree of 
sensitivity of the threatened data object should deter- 
mine the requirements on the systems to be designed. 
A suitable means of achieving this goal is the use of 
the European IT Security Evaluation Criteria /ITSEC/ 
for two reasons: 
1. They provide a basis for a standardized formula- 
tion of security aspects in the design documenta- 
tion. That means Basic Security Functions as laid 
down in ITSEC: 
- Identification and Authentication, 
- Access Control, 
- Accountability, 
- Audit,and 
- ObjectReuse 
are used accordingly to their ability to cover the 
actual threat(s) of each security relevant system 
b be analysed. In the same way the telecommu- 
nication security of all end-to-end telecommuni- 
cation services can be examined by means of: 
- peer entity authentication, 
- access control, 
- data confidentiality, 
- dataintegrity, 
- data origin authentication, and 
- non-repudiation. 
2. The security criteria give the sponsors valuable 
help for the formulation of requirements on and 
the Evaluation of Correctness and Effectiveness 
of the security characteristics. The ITSEC distin- 
guish seven hierarchically structured Evaluation 
Levels. Each Evaluation Level defines assurance 
requirements with regard to 
the Correctness of - the Development Process (Requirements, 
Architectural Design, Detailed Design, Im- 
plementation), 
- the Development En~~onment  (Con 
tion Control, Programming Language 
pilers, Developers Security), 
- the Operatio 
Documentation, Administration Documen- 
tation), and 
the Operational Environment (Delivery and 
Configuration, Start-up and Operation) 
the Construction (Suitability of Functiona- 
lity, Binding of Functionality, Strength of 
Mechanisms, and Construction Vulnerabi- 
lity) and 
the Operation (Ease of Use, and Operational 
Vulnerability). 
The following table shows a possible assignment of 
the ITSEG Evaluation Levels to the Sensitivity 
classes: 
- 
and the Effectiveness of 
- 
- 
Table 2:  Assignment of Evaluation Levels 
The Correctness and Effectiveness requirements on 
the systems are suited to the sensitivity of the data 
they process. That means the quality of a security 
related system increases with the sensitivity of its 
data. For example the ITSEC require from E2 
onwards, the support by a configuration control 
system, or from E4 onwards, a formally specified 
model of security. 
Table 3: Structure of Technical Countermeasures 
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R 
T - 
Iommunication 
Jse of secure/certified network 01 
ommunication software and hard. 
rare preferably as integral part of tht 
access control 
data confidentiality 
data integrity 
data origin authentication 
non-repudiation 
I lata Bases 
)atabase@) which administer for ex- 
mple the network management data, 
ngineering support data, and charac- 
:ristics data must be considered as 
'ery critical. The following set of ex- 
mplary security functions should be 
mplemenmk 
identification and authentication 
administration of user, roles (usex 
with special attributes), and pro- 
cess rights 
access only possible using speci- 
ally established processes 
defining new types, granting or re- 
voking access rights to existing 
types only by authorized users. 
initiated by this users via a trusted 
access to objects of certain types 
only via fixed established proces- 
verification of user roles, and pro- 
cess rights 
auditing definition or deletion 01 
types 
auditing granting or revoking 01 
access rights for objects or objecl 
trpes 
auditing remote data base access 
Path 
SeS 
Table 4: Structure of Technical Countermeasures 
A possible assignment of the functional requirements 
show Table 3 and 4 for the areas of systems soft- 
ware (operating systems), data bases, and communi- 
cations. The crosses in the right columns indicate me- 
These examples have a high abstraction level and 
give guidance for structuring requirements rather 
than providing them. More detailed specifications can 
be formulared such as in the following table: 
agical Access 
iutomated audit procedure, allowing 
he supervision and control of resource 
isage. It should detect successful or 
ittempted misuse of resources, soft- 
vare, and daa. This requires the de- 
ign of standardized audit interfaces to 
K implemented in each system (for 
:xample Workstations) to be monito- 
ed. Each system reports action to a 
:entralized audit manager. 
... 
vleasures against '*hackers** and "crac- 
iers" for example: 
avoiding naming of organization 
avoiding identification of hard. 
ware 
not using separate prompts foi 
User Name, ID, andpassword 
prohibiting message "Unautho. 
rized Access ..." 
protection of program code foi 
example by: 
- submitting program to admi 
nistration of access rights 
- frequent check of prograrr 
size and creation date - not leaving sensitive data 01 
software on the network ij 
avoidable. 
... 
Table S: Example of Security Requirements 
9 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL 
This chapter has been added to stress the fact that 
technical countermeasures alone, as raised in the pre 
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vious chapter, are insufficient to implement an effec- 
tive security system. 
technical security measures can be useless, if users do 
not secure their working areas (for example simply 
by locking doors, log off the work stations from the 
network, or by mentally noting their passwords rather 
than keeping a written note on their 
Technical measures must therefore be complemented 
by organizational means, which control their imple- 
mentation as well as ensuring their maintenance and 
development. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL 1: 
Establish independent securit 
with authority to act full time 
sues: 
Check (screening) 
example, only well educated 
perienced staff for devel 
such as maintenance 
cess to data processi 
.* 
Programme to ensure security awaren- : 
ess of staff and users, including the re- 
quirement to sign a statement to ack- 
nowledge understanding of their re- 
sponsibilities. 
... I 
Table 6: Complementing Organizational Measures 
Table 6 represents a subset of lists of suggestions to 
be seen as counterparts to the tables containing the 
technical countemeasures. They serve as a possible 
input for the agency's security policy that in general 
constitutes the proceduralization of the technical se- 
same way as it is known from an effective Quality 
Assurance System. 
10 CONCLUSION 
The described procedure for the elaboration of a se- 
curity concept can be applied to a lot of organisations 
which would certainly be worthwhile in many cases. 
Unfortunately security awareness arises only when 
something unexpected occurs (espionage, virus at- 
tack, failures, etc.). 
The approach as described in this paper can prepare 
the ground for finding a way of improving security 
within an organization. The approach is based first of 
all on the definition of data objects, whose sensitivity 
determines the correctness and the effectiveness of 
the security enforcing functions and the extent to 
which organisational measures has to be 
complemented. In order to systemize the design 
procedure, proven standpds can be applied. 
This procedure only has a chance of success, if it is 
regarded as necessary by the management of an orga- 
nisation and if the employees are motivated accordin- 
gly. Data security is an ongoing task and its effi- 
ciency depends considerably on how it is planned and 
supervised by the security staff. 
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